

Message Text

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41

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 IO-15 ISO-00 NEAE-00 NSCE-00

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SS-15 ACDA-19 DRC-01 AID-20 /169 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0011

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 7819

E O 11652: GDS

TAGRC PFOR, MOPS, XF, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELIS BEGIN POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF WAR

1. INITIAL PRESS REACTION TO SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN ATTACK SPECULATES ON MOTIVES UNDERLYING ARAB DECISION TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES, ASSESSES GOI POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR NOT LAUNCHING PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK, AND COMMENTS ON DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. PAPERS FRONTPAGE STORIES ON EVACUATION OF SOVIET DEPENDENTS AND ADVISERS FROM SYRIA AND EGYPT, SUGGESTING THAT THIS SHOWS MOSCOW WANTED NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT IT CALCULATED WAS IMPENDING.
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ING ARAB FIASCO. ONE PAPER FEATURES WIRE SERVICE REPORTS OF

STATEMENT BY UN SPOKESMAN IN NEW YORK TO EFFECT THAT UN OBSERVERS ON SPOT HAD CONFIRMED THAT ARABS INITIATED PRESENT HOSTILITIES.

2. IN ASSESSING MOTIVES FOR INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES, HAARETZ COMMENTARY SPECULATES THAT ARABS HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT EXPECTING AN ATTACK, AND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE ONE HAND WOULD SAFEGUARD ANY SUCCESSES THEY ACHIEVED AND ON THE OTHER WOULD SAVE THEM IF THEY FAILED. JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL SPEAKS OF "FAIRY TALE LOGIC" BY WHICH ARABS HAD CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT AFTER YOM KIPPUR FASTING THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE TOO WEAK TO RESPOND MILITARILY.

GUINNAY
(YEDYOT AHARONOT) SUGGESTS THAT ARABS MIGHT BELIEVE THAT ONLY CREATION OF NEW MILITARY EMERGENCY COULD FURTHER THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AT THIS STAGE.

3. YEDYOT AHARONOT WRITES THAT ISRAEL HAS AFTER SOME DELIBERATION DESISTED FROM PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BECAUSE SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE RISKED ISOLATION OF GOI IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ARTICLE ADDS THAT FRONT IS SUFFICIENTLY FAR AWAY, FOR FIRST TIME, THAT GOI COULD AFFORD TO WAIT. RISK OF THIS STRATEGY WAS THAT SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT IMPOSE CEASEFIRE WHILE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS HELD NEWLY CONQUERED TERRITORY. DAVAR ADDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD PURSUE THE WAR "TO COMPLETE THE CHAIZER THAT WAS NOT COMPLETED DURING SIX DAY WAR."

4. ON INTERNATIONAL FRONT, MAARIV'S WASHINGTON REPORTER SEGEV WRITES THAT US WANTS TO STOP THE FIGHTING BUT HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TURN TO UN OR TO OTHER DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, AND MEANWHILE IS DELAYING UN CEASEFIRE EFFORTS. ISRAEL, HE ADDS, AGREES TO US DELAYING TACTICS. YEDYOT MORE POINTEDLY CLAIMS THAT US IS GOING THROUGH MOTIONS OF FAVORING AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE BUT ACTUALLY IS GIVING ISRAEL TIME TO PUSH EGYPTIANS BACK ACROSS CANAL. ARTICLE NOTES THAT PRESIDENT HAS NOT RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AND THAT STATE DEPT-PENTAGON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP INTERRUPTED ITS MORNING ACTIVITY WITHOUT HAVING REACHED DECISION YET ON WHETHER CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE SOUGHT IMMEDIATELY.

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5. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE, AS ABOVE PRESS MATERIAL SUGGESTS, THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC AT THIS POINT CONSIDERS THAT ARABS WENT TO WAR FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVES; THAT GOI DID RIGHT THING IN FOREGOING PREEMPTION DESPITE COST; AND THAT US WILL PROTECT ISRAEL IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA UNTIL WRONG OF OCTOBER 6 HAS BEEN RIGHTED ON BATTLEFIELD. WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, ISRAELI NEWS MEDIA AS OF MID OCTOBER 7 IS BEING FED ALMOST NO INFO ON CERTAIN BATTLEFIELD DIFFICULTIES, OF WHICH PUBLIC IS STILL UNAWARE.

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